XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as
Strength)
This word (apathy) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant
want of feeling, and therefore subjective indifference with respect to
the objects of the elective will; it is supposed to be a weakness.
This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to
that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference.
In the former, the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose
their influence on the moral feeling only because the respect for
the law is more powerful than all of them together. It is only the
apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively
sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or rather degenerate into it.
Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this
that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended
in virtuous practices:
Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus uniqui
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.*
*Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the name of fool, and the just of
unjust, if he pursue virtue herself beyond the proper bounds."]
For otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise
or too virtuous. The emotion always belongs to the sensibility, no
matter by what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength
of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to
bring its law into practice.
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