The imperative: "Thou shalt make this or that thy end (e.
g., the happiness of others)" applies to the matter of the elective
will (an object). Now since no free action is possible, without the
agent having in view in it some end (as matter of his elective
will), it follows that, if there is an end which is also a duty, the
maxims of actions which are means to ends must contain only the
condition of fitness for a possible universal legislation: on the
other hand, the end which is also a duty can make it a law that we
should have such a maxim, whilst for the maxim itself the
possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is sufficient.
For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by
the condition of fitness for a universal legislation, which is the
formal principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary
character of actions, and is by this distinguished from recommendation
(in which one only desires to know the best means to an end).
VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of
strict, Obligation
This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law
can only command the maxim of the actions, not the actions themselves,
this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude
(latitudo) for the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign
how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is
also duty.
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