Hence
Professor Clifford's conclusion cannot be regarded as valid until all the
other arguments in favour of Theism have been separately refuted. Doubtless
Professor Clifford will be the first to recognise the cogency of this
criticism--if indeed it has not already occurred to him; for as I know that
he is much too clear a thinker not to perceive the validity of these
considerations, I am willing to believe that the substance of them was
omitted from his essay merely for the sake of brevity; but, for the sake of
less thoughtful persons, I have deemed it desirable to state thus clearly
that the problem of Theism cannot be solved on grounds of Materialism
alone. [This note was written before I had the advantage of Professor
Clifford's acquaintance, but now I leave it, as I leave all other parts of
this essay--viz., as it was originally written.--1878.]
[8] To avoid burdening the text, I have omitted another criticism which may
be made on Locke's argument. "Triangle" is a word by which we designate a
certain figure, one of the properties of which is that the sum of its
angles is equal to two right angles. In other words, any figure which does
not exhibit this property is not that figure which we designate a triangle.
Hence, when Locke says he cannot conceive of a triangle which does not
present this property, it may be answered that his inability arises merely
from the fact that any figure which fails to present this property is not a
figure to which the term "triangle" can apply.
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