Lastly, in the third place, we saw that even if Mr. Spencer's argument were
fully subscribed to, and Mind in its substantial essence were conceded to
be causeless, the central position of Materialism would still remain
unaffected. For Mr. Spencer does not suppose that his "units of Force" are
themselves endowed with consciousness, any more than Professor Clifford
supposes his "moving molecules of inorganic matter" to be thus endowed. So
that the only change which these possibilities, even if conceded to be
actualities, produce in the speculative standing of Materialism, is to show
that the raw material of consciousness, instead of requiring to be _caused_
by other substances--Matter and Force, _x_ and _y_,--occurs ready made as
those substances. But the essential feature of Materialism remains
untouched--namely, that what we know as Mind is dependent (whether by way
of causality or not is immaterial) on highly complex forms of _what we
know_ as Matter, in association with highly peculiar distributions of _what
we know_ as Force.
* * * * *
IV.
THE FINAL MYSTERY OF THINGS.
Some physicists are inclined to dispute the fundamental proposition in
which the whole of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy may be said to
rest--the proposition, namely, that the fact of the "persistence of force"
constitutes the ultimate basis of science. For my own part, I cannot but
believe that any disagreement on this matter only arises from some want of
mutual understanding; and, therefore, in order to anticipate any criticisms
to which the present work may be open on this score, I append this
explanatory note.
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