But as it is, all the so-called
evidence of divine beneficence in nature is, without any exception of a
kind that is worthless as proving _design_; for all the facts admit of
being explained equally well on the supposition of their having been due to
purely physical processes, acting through the various biological laws which
we are now only beginning to understand. And further than this, so far are
these facts from proving the existence of a moral cause, that, in view of
the alternative just stated, they even ground a positive argument to its
negation. For, as we have seen, all these facts are just of such a kind as
we should expect to be the facts, on the supposition of their having been
due to natural causes--_i.e._, causes which could have had no moral
solicitude for animal happiness as such. Let us now, in conclusion, dwell
on this antithesis at somewhat greater length.
If natural selection has played any large share in the process of organic
evolution, it is evident that animal enjoyment, being an important factor
in this natural cause, must always have been furthered _to the extent in
which it was necessary for the adaptation of organisms to their
environment_ that it should. And such we invariably find to be the limits
within which animal enjoyments _are_ confined. On the other hand, so long
as the adaptations in question are not complete, so long must more or less
of suffering be entailed--the capacity for suffering, as for enjoyment,
being no doubt itself a product of natural selection.
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