Therefore, to sum up these considerations on physical suffering, the case
between a theist and a sceptic as to the question of divine beneficence is
seen to be a case of extreme simplicity. The theist believes in such
beneficence by purposely concealing from his mind all adverse
evidence--feeling, on the one side, that to entertain the doubt to which
this evidence points would be to hold dalliance with blasphemy, and, on the
other side, that the subject is of so transcendental a nature that, in view
of so great a risk, it is better to avoid impartial reasoning upon it. A
sceptic, on the other hand, is under no such obligation to preconceived
ideas, and is therefore free to draw unbiassed inferences as to the
character of God, if he exists, to the extent which such character is
indicated by the sphere of observable nature. And, as I have said, when the
subject is so viewed, the inference is unavoidable that, so far as human
reason can penetrate, God, if he exists, must either be non-infinite in his
resources, or non-beneficent in his designs. Therefore it is evident that
when the _being_ of God, as distinguished from his _character_, is the
subject in dispute, Theism can gain nothing by an appeal to evidences of
_beneficent_ designs. If such evidences were unequivocal, then indeed the
argument which they would establish to an intelligent cause of nature would
be almost irresistible; for the fact of the external world being in harmony
with the moral nature of man would be unaccountable except on the
supposition of both having derived their origin from a common _moral_
source; and morality implies intelligence.
Pages:
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232