" Further, within experience mind is invariably
associated with highly differentiated collocations of matter and
distributions of force, and many facts go to prove, and none to negative,
the conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or
at least is associated with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development.
There is thus both a qualitative and a quantitative relation between
intelligence and cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and
motion cannot produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they
should, we have seen at some length that this is no conclusive
consideration as applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental
nature, and that in the present case it is particularly inconclusive,
because, as it is speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be
unknowable, it seems _a priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the
unknowable reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into
thought in that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which
is imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_
conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is in
this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly, the
statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects can
contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by everyday
experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the will and
the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively by the
theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of utilitarianism.
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