And if there is no other objection to my believing in
Intelligence as the cause of my intelligence, than that I cannot prove my
own intelligence caused, then I am satisfied to let the matter rest here;
for as every argument must have _some_ basis of assumption to stand upon, I
am well pleased to find that the basis in this case is the most solid which
experience can supply, viz.,--the law of causation. Fully admitting that it
does not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior
mind for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, _does_ account for the
fact that _my mind_ exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intended
to cover. For to endeavour to _explain_ the existence of an _eternal_ mind,
could only be done by those who do not understand the meaning of these
words."
Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would so
far be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis _does_ supply a provisional
explanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, an
explanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain.
But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation of
his own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in the
abstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypothetically
explaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing a
probability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind.
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