" After
which the passage continues, "It is true there are cases in which, with
acknowledged propriety, we generalise from a single instance to a multitude
of instances. But they must be instances which resemble the one known
instance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with it except
that of being instances.... But the supporters of the volition theory ask
us to infer that volition causes everything, for no other reason except
that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from
being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws
bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether
of inorganic or of organic nature."[3]
* * * * *
CHAPTER II.
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND.
Sec. 8. Leaving now the obviously untenable arguments, we next come to those
which, in my opinion, may properly be termed scientific.
It will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under one
or other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of Theism
will be found to range themselves.
Sec. 9. We have first the argument drawn from the existence of the human mind.
This is an argument which, for at least the last three centuries, and
especially during the present one, has been more relied upon than any other
by philosophical thinkers. It consists in the reflection that the being of
our own subjective intelligence is the most certain fact which our
experience supplies, that this fact demands an adequate cause for its
explanation, and that the only adequate cause of our intelligence must be
some other intelligence.
Pages:
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34