The burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and from the nature of
the case this burden cannot be discharged until the science of psychology
shall have been fully perfected. I may add that, for my own part, I cannot
help feeling that, even in the present embryonic condition of this science,
we are not without some indications of the manner in which the aspirations
in question arose; but even were this not so, the above considerations
prove that the argument before us is invalid. If it is retorted that the
fact of these aspirations having had _proximate_ causes to account for
their origin, even if made out, would not negative the inference of these
being due to a Deity as to their _ultimate_ cause; I answer that this is
not to use the argument from the presence of these aspirations; it is
merely to beg the question as to the being of a God.
Sec. 6. Next, we may consider the argument from consciousness. Many persons
ground their belief in the existence of a Deity upon a real or supposed
necessity of their own subjective thought. I say "real or supposed,"
because, in its bearing upon rational argument, it is of no consequence of
which character the alleged necessity actually is. Even if the necessity of
thought be real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to affirm is, that
it is impossible for _him_, by any effort of thinking, to rid himself of
the persuasion that God exists; he is not entitled to affirm that this
persuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the human mind.
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