They had nothing to fear from the enemy's
cavalry, to whom they proved themselves immensely superior, whenever they
met during the war, and they had it in their power, for months, to cut
the British communications and so oblige them, either to detach so large
a force to keep the roads open that they would have been unable to push
on the siege, and would indeed have been in danger of being attacked and
destroyed by the Irish infantry; or to raise the siege, and fall back
upon their bases, Dublin and Waterford.
The only possible explanations that can be offered are--first, that
Sarsfield, although a dashing commander in action, was possessed of no
military genius whatever; second, that he was prevented from moving by
the jealousy of the French commanders-in-chief, who did not wish to see
the credit of compelling the enemy to fall back monopolized by the Irish
cavalry; or, third, that Sarsfield saw the advantages which could be
obtained by throwing himself, with his cavalry, in the rear of the enemy,
but deliberately remained inactive rather than leave the French generals
to act, unchecked by his presence at headquarters. It can never be
decided to which of these alternatives it was due that the Irish cavalry
remained for so long a time inactive, and that William, and after him
Ginckle, were permitted, unmolested save by a few detached bodies of
horse, to maintain their long line of communications to their base,
unchecked.
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