But
the philosophic reason for this has not been given; which reason, by the
way, settles a question often agitated, viz. whether the true meaning of a
word be best ascertained from its etymology, or from its present use and
acceptation. Mr. Coleridge says, 'the best explanation of a word is often
that which is suggested by its derivation' (I give the substance of his
words from memory). Others allege that we have nothing to do with the
primitive meaning of the word; that the question is--what does it mean
now? and they appeal, as the sole authority they acknowledge, to the
received--
Usus, penes quem est jus et norma loquendi.
In what degree each party is right, may be judged from this consideration
--that no word can ever deviate from its first meaning _per saltum_:
each successive stage of meaning must always have been determined by that
which preceded. And on this one law depends the whole philosophy of the
case: for it thus appears that the original and primitive sense of the
word will contain virtually all which can ever afterwards arise: as in the
_evolution_-theory of generation, the whole series of births is
represented as involved in the first parent. Now, if the evolution of
successive meanings has gone on rightly, _i.e._ by simply lapsing
through a series of close affinities, there can be no reason for recurring
to the primitive meaning of the word: but, if it can be shown that the
evolution has been faulty, _i.
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